The PRC and Central Asia Now Focusing on Iran as Additional Route West
The People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the countries of Central Asia are now focusing on Iran as an additional trade route between Asia and Europe. This move reflects the PRC’s desire to have multiple paths lest any one be blocked or intermodal transfers increase costs, and because of its confidence and that of the Central Asian countries that east–west trade volumes will continue to grow (Chengdu.cn, September 3; Eurasia Today, September 7; Nezavisimaya Gazeta, September 8; Asia Today, September 11). Central Asian countries are moving from an “either/or” to a “both/and” approach not only because they recognize the risks of relying on one path alone, but also because the PRC is paying for most of the necessary transportation infrastructure. They are particularly worried about the ways the Caspian is becoming “a bottleneck,” given falling water levels, siltification, and reduced ship cargo capacity (Nezavisimaya, September 8). Such a shift, however, changes the geo-economics and geopolitics of much more than Central Asia, affecting, as it does, the role of Russia and the South Caucasus as transit routes and of powers such as Türkiye and the United States, which have placed their bets on the development of a single route (see EDM, September 21).
Since the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991 and especially after relations between Russia and the West soured after Russian President Vladimir Putin seized Ukraine’s Crimea in 2014 and his expanded invasion of that country in 2022, ever more countries have focused on what is unofficially known as the Middle Corridor, or the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR). The route extends from the PRC to Türkiye, covering some 4,250 kilometers (2,640 miles) on land and 500 kilometers (310 miles) via sea. This route is called the Middle Corridor, in contrast to the Northern Corridor via Russia and the Southern Corridor via the Suez Canal. The Middle Corridor is considered a central part of the PRC’s One Belt One Road initiative to expand trade with Europe. The countries of Central Asia have seen it as a way to escape the limitations of their landlocked situations (see EDM, April 28, July 28). The understanding of what the Middle Corridor consists of is changing. The West generally views it as a single route across the Caspian, while the PRC and, following it, Central Asia think of it more broadly.
Three reasons explain this so-far little-noted change. First, the costs of intermodal shifts from land to sea and back to land have limited the time and money advantages the shorter Middle Corridor would otherwise offer. Second, the Caspian Sea, once viewed as a bridge, is becoming a bottleneck as declining water levels force ships crossing it to reduce cargo weight by 25 to 40 percent (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, September 8). Finally, the PRC’s massive railway construction effort in Central Asia means that cargo can now be shipped west via Iran without the costs of intermodal shifts and still be attractive to Central Asian states because that route too allows them to be freer of earlier Russian dominance (Window on Eurasia, May 14, 2023, December 13, 2025; see EDM, July 23).
The PRC’s development of railways in Central Asia, especially in Turkmenistan, has contributed to Beijing’s interest in developing a route west via Iran, especially given the increasing problems of the Caspian. This interest, however, has now collided with intensified U.S. efforts over the past two months to isolate Iran and to threaten any country that trades with Iran with sanctions of one kind or another—and access to U.S. financial markets in the first instance (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, September 8). The amount of trade now between the Central Asian countries and Iran, to be sure, is still relatively small, and between the PRC and Iran via Central Asia still minuscule, but it is all rising fast. Both seek to keep developing it, as it could continue to grow in importance, especially if the Caspian route becomes less commercially viable because of falling water levels.
The PRC is unlikely to back down. It has proceeded relatively cautiously, developing rail routes through Turkmenistan that can in most cases also be used to send cargo westward through the Caspian route, something Azerbaijan has been promoting (see EDM, September 10). In the words of one Russian analyst, Beijing remains committed to maintaining multiple corridors not only because it gives it leverage over the countries through which its goods pass, but also as a kind of insurance against the risks it would face if one were blocked (Eurasia Today, September 7). So far, at least, most Central Asian countries have responded quietly or not at all to Western demands that they break their economic ties with Iran. Analysts in the region, however, believe they will continue to develop these ties below the radar lest they lose their ability to pursue the multi-vector foreign policies they have pursued. Central Asian states fear they could once again become more heavily dominated by Russia, which would again become their primary trade route out if the Caspian becomes a less attractive option and Iran becomes truly off limits (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, September 8; Kaspiiskiy Vestnik, September 10).
These trends are not limited to the PRC, Central Asia, and Iran. It affects Russia in the first instance because a shift of Chinese trade to Iran will likely reduce Beijing’s commitment to support Moscow more generally (see EDM, September 10). It affects the countries of the South Caucasus, which have been counting on the development of the Middle Corridor, narrowly defined, to improve their economic situation and geopolitical standing (see EDM, April 30, September 9, 10). Perhaps most importantly, the possible expansion of Central Asian trade via Iran affects Türkiye’s relationship with the region and that of the European Union and the United States (see EDM, May 19). If Central Asian countries trade more with Iran, they will be better able to strike an independent line with Türkiye and the West, a development that will, in turn, complicate relations among all of them and this region.
Looming beyond that is the relationship between the PRC and all these countries. Beijing has made it clear that it seeks to develop multiple routes west and that it will continue to use them. Consequently, Western countries can no longer count on the PRC to choose among them as it once assumed it could. Instead, they will face a situation in which the PRC will not only use all existing routes but also develop new ones, as it is now doing with Iran.